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[REDACTED]  
Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D C 20505

25 February 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Attached Distribution

SUBJECT: West African Fisheries: Reevaluating  
the Soviet Role [REDACTED]

1. The attached memorandum reports on the growing dissatisfaction among West African coastal states with Soviet fishing agreements, updates the status of those accords, examines prospects for possible substitutes, and assesses the impact of recent changes in West African enforcement capabilities. The report includes several graphics illustrating the distribution of Soviet fishing vessels in African waters for the 1986 to mid-1987 time frame.

[REDACTED]

2. The report was prepared by [REDACTED] Geographic Issues Division, Office of Global Issues, with a contribution from [REDACTED] Analytic Methods Branch, Office of Information Resources. [REDACTED]

3. Your comments and questions on this memorandum are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Geographic Issues Division, OGI [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
Chief, Geographic Issues Division

Attachment:  
GI M 88-20013

SUBJECT: West African Fisheries: Reevaluating the Soviet  
Role [REDACTED]

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OGI/GD/TW/[REDACTED] (24Feb88)

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Washington, D.C. 20505

## DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

. 23 February 1988

West African Fisheries: Reevaluating The Soviet Role [redacted]

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Summary

West African coastal states are becoming increasingly concerned over aggressive Soviet fishing practices.

[redacted] a number of the states are particularly dissatisfied with Moscow because of the unfavorable terms of current Soviet fishing agreements, and Soviet violations of treaty terms and local laws protecting offshore resources. [redacted]

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[redacted] coastal states are trying to lessen their vulnerability by pressing--in some cases successfully--for more favorable terms during treaty negotiations and by taking steps to strengthen their control over their offshore waters. As a result, we believe that the Soviet Union is now more vulnerable than in the past to reversals in the long-standing West African fisheries program that provides Moscow easy access to LDC port facilities, an inexpensive source of protein, and valuable foreign exchange from the sale of fish. [redacted]

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Although African states are displaying a willingness to be tough negotiators, they still face a number of important constraints that limit their ability in dealing with Moscow. These countries still must find good alternative sources of

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This paper was prepared by [redacted] Third World Branch, Geographic Issues Division, Office of Global Issues, with a contribution from [redacted] Analytic Methods Branch, Office of Information Resources. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to Chief, Third World Branch, Geographic Issues Division, OGI [redacted]

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the revenues, equipment, and fish supplies provided by the Soviets before they will have sufficient leverage to persuade Moscow to agree to demands that will reduce long-term Soviet influence. Any new arrangements with the European Community (EC) and South Korea--the other major non-Bloc parties now working West African waters--will probably not by themselves fill the gap, because they are likely to be smaller in scope than the Soviet accords and to be focused on already heavily fished high-value species like octopus and cuttlefish.

Coastal states continue to lack the ability to effectively control their offshore waters, but several with Western assistance are refining maritime policies and laws and pursuing more aggressive patrol programs aimed at reducing unauthorized fishing in offshore waters. According to Embassy and [redacted] over the past few years a number of regional states, for example, have strengthened existing maritime codes, effectively utilized underequipped patrol boats to seize violators, and increased the number of hours that patrol vessels are at sea. [redacted]

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Despite these gains and a brighter outlook than before, future progress will probably not be rapid, and countering Soviet influence in the West African fishing sector will likely require continued Western encouragement, tangible evidence of support for managing the resource, and improved prospects for alternatives to Soviet presence. [redacted]

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Scope Note




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[redacted] The regional states are particularly dissatisfied with Moscow's fishing practices and are seeking to reduce their reliance on Soviet agreements. This paper provides an update on the status of Soviet accords with coastal states, examines prospects for possible substitutes, and assesses the impact of recent changes in West African enforcement capabilities. [redacted]

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## West African Fisheries



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## THE FISHERY RESOURCE

The distribution of fish within West African waters is uneven, but two distinct zones are apparent: a Northern zone extending from Morocco through Liberia, and a Southern zone extending from the Ivory Coast through Zaire (See Map). The richest concentrations of fish occur off the northwest coast; waters to the south are less productive. Foreign fishing vessels operate primarily in the north, but find markets for their harvest among the more heavily populated countries of the south. [ ]

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Five major types of fish are harvested:

Coastal pelagic species (sardines, sardinella, mackerel, etc.) account for about 60 percent of the region's catch by volume. Heavy fishing of these species by Soviet and East European fleets as well as by local traditional fishermen in the Northern zone is placing stress on existing stocks. Management is difficult because of the migratory habits of the species. [ ]

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Cephalopods (cuttlefish, squid, and octopus) make up the region's most valuable catches. The main cephalopod grounds lie in the Northern Zone off Morocco, Mauritania, and Senegal. Spanish, Moroccan, South Korean, and Mauritanian vessels harvest most of the catch which is then marketed mainly in Europe and Japan. Signs of overfishing have been reported. [ ]

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Crustacea (mainly shrimp) are found mostly near river mouths and are fully exploited in both zones. Spanish and other non-African vessels harvest about half and the total catch. Senegal exports significant amounts. The extensive involvement of traditional as well as industrial fishermen in shrimping makes proper management of the stocks difficult. [ ]

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Demersal fish (bottom-dwellers including seabream, hake, croakers, sole) are heavily fished in the Northern Zone by Spanish, Portuguese, Soviet, and African industrial vessels. In the Southern Zone African fishermen harvest stocks in the inshore areas, but fishery experts see room for expansion offshore. Good management of this fishery is feasible because of the limited involvement of traditional fishermen. [ ]

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Ocean pelagic species (tuna) form an important resource for the African industrial fleets with both Ghana and the Ivory Coast harvesting significant amounts. Spanish and French vessels, using Abidjan, Ivory Coast as their main regional base, are also active. [ ]

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[ ] prospects for good fishing in the Indian Ocean may draw more French, Spanish and other vessels out of West African waters. [ ]


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Graphic 1



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West African Fisheries: Reevaluating The Soviet Role [REDACTED]

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Introduction

Extensive offshore fisheries resources present impoverished West African coastal states with opportunities for improved food supplies and hard currency earnings. According to national trade statistics, fish and fish products are among the primary sources of foreign exchange earnings in Mauritania, Cape Verde, Senegal, and Guinea-Bissau, and they also generate sizeable revenues for Morocco and Sierra Leone. Fisheries, for example, provided Senegal with approximately \$167 million in 1985, about 23 percent of that country's export earnings, and a recent analysis of Guinea-Bissau's fishery sector showed that it provides 30 percent of that country's inflow of foreign exchange. [REDACTED]

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Nevertheless, West African countries continue to lose many of the potential benefits of their fisheries resource as a result of the unfavorable terms of longstanding fishery agreements with the Soviets. According to Embassy reporting, much of the money earned from the sale of fish caught under joint venture agreements never reaches the African States. Much of the revenue goes directly to Moscow to pay off outstanding debts. Moreover, although terms generally call for a set percentage of the Soviet catch to be delivered to the local African market, the common Soviet practice of underreporting catches reduces the amount of fish actually delivered. [REDACTED]

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Moscow also is taking advantage of the coastal states' limited ability to patrol their offshore waters. Although several countries, including Spain and South Korea, also engage in illegal fishing, we calculate, based on the number of Soviet vessels present in African waters and the volume of the reported catch that the Soviet Union is the worst offender. A team of US Coast Guard fishery control experts recently concluded that in Senegal's case annual revenues from fisheries could be increased by at least 600 percent if the Senegalese would develop more comprehensive legislation that was supported by better enforcement. Similarly, a report on Guinea-Bissau concluded that spending funds on more effective surveillance of the Bissauan Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) would provide the greatest benefit/cost ratio of any investments in the fishery sector. [REDACTED]

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Dimensions of Soviet Involvement

Soviet statistics show that the USSR is the key foreign consumer of West African fish. Officially reported Soviet and East European catches as a portion of total regional production fell by 4 percent between 1983 and 1985--probably the result of declining fish stocks and problems in obtaining licenses--but still exceed all other non-African catches combined. Soviet

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bloc activity accounted for 30 percent of the total catch by volume in 1985, the latest year for which statistics are available (See Figure). Based on Soviet tonnage statistics the value of their 1985 catch in the region was between \$350 and \$450 million.

If anything the Soviet numbers underrepresent the level of Soviet involvement. A study of West African fisheries prepared for the US Department of Defense estimates that the Soviets are catching three times as much as they report, and a recent Embassy analysis of Soviet operations in Mauritanian waters indicates that the Soviets are harvesting nearly twice the volume they report. [redacted]

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### West African Reaction

Coastal states are increasingly aware that unfavorable fishing agreements with the Soviets limit fishing revenues and pose a threat to marine fishery resources, and they are reevaluating the Soviet role, according to Embassy and [redacted]

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[redacted] These same sources indicate that regional states are seeking to reduce dependence on Moscow by pressing for more favorable agreements, strengthening existing fishing codes, and attempting to improve enforcement capabilities. [redacted]

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[redacted] West Africans are dissatisfied with common Soviet fishing practices:

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
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- Soviet vessels often fish illegally in inshore areas reserved for local fisherman and compete with them for resources. In Sierra Leone, for example, the Embassy reports that Soviet trawlers fish in prohibited zones and frequently destroy nets set by local fishermen.
- Soviet vessels harass local fishing vessels, resulting in loss of tow nets, lines--often deliberately sliced--and equipment. [redacted] the Soviet practice of passing astern deep-water fishing boats pulls lines and nets, thus, damaging equipment.
- The Soviets destroy breeding grounds by dragging nets along the ocean floor and by using extra fine nets. The mesh of a fishing net found on a Soviet vessel seized in Mauritanian waters, for example, was eleven times finer than the smallest net authorized in United States waters, according to an Embassy report.
- Large Soviet trawlers use "aggressive maneuvering" to keep other vessels out of prime fishing waters, resulting in frequent collisions and injuries. Several collisions have been reported in Mauritanian waters over the past few years, according to an Embassy report.

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# CATCH\* BY COUNTRY West African Waters 1985



\*Fish, crustaceans, and molluscs.

<sup>ee</sup>Spain and Portugal did not become members of the European Economic Community until 1986.

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Table 1

Catch by Country in West Africa Waters  
(selected years)

<u>Country</u>	<u>1977</u> <u>mt</u>	<u>1979</u> <u>mt</u>	<u>1981</u> <u>mt</u>	<u>1983</u> <u>mt</u>	<u>1985</u> <u>mt</u>
Angola	400	400	400	182	182
Benin	4,378	3,900	3,568	3,599	3,806F
Bulgaria	48,454	--	8,996	10,485	--
Cameroon	40,167F	39,002F	38,961F	34,277F	30,000F
Cape Verde	6,000	7,476F	14,272	11,690	10,166
China	--	--	--	--	--
Congo	15,364	19,630	17,665	19,926	20,000F
Cote d'Ivoire	79,307	71,613	71,993	72,227	75,098
Cuba	20,670	6,924	8,821	6,670	13,042
Egypt	15,000	--	--	--	--
Eq Guinea	4,000R	4,000R	2,500	2,341F	3,200
France	70,850	58,604	66,666	57,402	22,330
Gabon	5,656F	13,203	38,675	52,899	45,854F
Gambia	15,392	8,443	11,368	8,953	8,012
German Dm Rp	18,820	42,635	103,904	50,800	20,778
Ghana	209,468	194,734	199,894	205,836	214,171F
Greece	26,955	20,185	14,953	8,561	9,000F
Guinea	8,120F	17,453	20,700F	24,400F	28,000F
Guinea Bissau	3,824	2,178	2,669	2,617	3,600F
Italy	26,234	28,282	12,165	27,166	27,415
Japan	67,796	44,836	47,778	15,949	20,299
Korea Rep	99,043	92,720	96,931	61,377	50,651
Liberia	6,190F	9,484	9,004	11,277	7,478
Mauritania	27,100F	20,200F	52,779	42,849	45,000F
Morocco	225,832	249,114	349,098	420,215	436,686
Nigeria	263,850	275,803	313,070	296,546	154,252
Panama	6,253	2,922	3,323	6,587	4,010F
Poland	203,429	67,703	1,632	--	--
Portugal	18,999	11,350	13,157	20,139	29,606
Romania	78,431	45,507	85,567	51,584	85,978
Sao Tome Prn	889	475	2,158	4,012	4,355F
Senegal	201,701	210,185	210,509	248,150	229,002R
Sierra Leone	51,452	46,237	35,300F	35,141	36,500F
Spain	440,378	370,543	406,712F	386,986F	395,449F
Togo	10,297	7,396	9,625	13,856	14,844
USSR	1,134,433	526,011	780,597	935,833	708,120
USA	10,616	2,764	3,904	19	--
Zaire	1,155	693	640F	1,000F	1,000F
Other	221,210F	201,396F	204,509F	14,668F	4,230F
Total	3,688,113	2,724,001	3,264,463	3,166,219	2,762,114

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F Fao Estimate from available sources of information

R Repetition of data previously reported by the country or area

BOX\*\*\*\*\*

Soviet Fishing In Perspective

Soviet earnings in the fishing sector in 1985 alone exceeded the value of the USSR's combined total economic assistance and military deliveries over the previous five years all to West African countries that have Soviet fishing agreements. We estimate that these nations drew some \$173.8 million in military aid during 1981-85, most of which went to Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. Economic assistance tallied about \$9 million during 1980-85, including \$1.5 million in fishery-related aid. [REDACTED]

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SOVIET AID DISBURSALS TO WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES WITH ACTIVE  
OR SUSPENDED FISHERY AGREEMENTS, 1981-85\*

	Total	Economic of which, fish	Million US Dollars Military**
Morocco	20.0	--	0.07
Mauritania	6.5	--	--
Guinea	40.5	0.5	83.8
Guinea-Bissau	20.5	--	87.8
Sierra Leone	3.5	1.0	1.5
Total	91.0	1.5	173.8

\*Economic aid includes 1980 disbursements


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
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Soviet Fishing Vessel Activity, 1986 to mid-1987




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Soviet Fish Factory Trawler Activity, 1986 to mid-1987



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Soviet Refrigerated Trawler Activity, 1986 to mid-1987



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--Soviet vessels often fish near the edges of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and maritime boundaries, allowing them to move into sovereign waters under cover of darkness, and facilitating their rapid movement to "safe" areas. In Senegal, for instance, [redacted] indicates that Dakar's efforts to control its EEZ have been frustrated by Soviet vessels operating in border zones which move into Mauritanian waters when being pursued.

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--Soviet vessels in port radio warnings to Soviet fishing vessels when naval or coast guard patrol boats exit port. [redacted] Mauritania's Naval Director complains that practice makes it very difficult to catch violators. [redacted]

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--The fish provided back to the West African States under terms of bilateral accords have generally been of poor quality and often must be paid for in hard currency. Several Guinean government officials have indicated their displeasure with the quality of the fish supplied by the Soviets. [redacted]

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[redacted] Soviets vessels often fish within the restricted inshore area to catch smaller, cheaper junk fish that they use to satisfy the requirements of their fishing agreement with the Guineans.


--The Soviet Union sometimes fails to provide spare parts or make repairs to vessels provided under bilateral agreements. According to an Embassy report in May 1986, the entire Soviet supplied Guinea-Bissau fleet had been out of commission for a year because of lack of spare parts, and the Soviets were refusing to make the necessary repairs until the Guineans paid for the boats.

--Soviet vessels licensed to fish for the less valuable pelagic species also net significant quantities of the more valuable demersal species. US Embassy Nouakchott estimates that between ten and twenty percent of the harvest of the Soviet pelagic fleet is composed of the more valuable species.

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### Stalled Accords

As a result of these grievances, Morocco and Guinea have suspended Soviet fishing agreements and Sierra Leone is



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attempting to negotiate a new more favorable arrangement, while Mauritania and Guinea Bissau recently toughened the terms of their accords. [redacted]

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### Morocco

Licensing of Soviet vessels to fish in Moroccan waters was suspended in 1985 after a Soviet factory ship purchased the catch of local fishermen at sea and attempted to sell it to Moroccan canneries at a profit. Nevertheless, the Soviets are still allowed to transit Moroccan fishing grounds and Rabat, [redacted] believes they are fishing illegally--especially in waters off Western Sahara that are claimed by Morocco. A Moroccan delegation to Moscow in May 1987 failed to resolve differences. The US Embassy in Rabat reports that the Soviets now are pressuring Morocco to establish a limited joint venture and are likely to press for a broader fishing agreement using as leverage the purchase of Moroccan phosphates, revenues from port services, and promises to construct a dam. [redacted]

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Moroccan Fishing Ministry officials remain opposed to an agreement, which they say would legalize wholesale plunder of their waters. [redacted]

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### Guinea

Guinea suspended its fishing agreement with the Soviets in August 1986, according to a [redacted]

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[redacted] Guinean disenchantment with the fishing agreement--which dates back to 1966--has increased in recent years as the discrepancy between benefits and costs has become more apparent. For instance, an Embassy Conakry report indicates that in 1985 Guinea paid the Soviets approximately \$3.5 million for 10,000 metric tons of inferior quality fish caught in their own waters, while the Soviets paid only about \$812,000 in fees for the estimated 80,000 metric tons--valued at perhaps \$40 million--which were extracted from Guinean waters. According to a [redacted] a Soviet source indicated that Guineans are no longer buying fish from Soviet trawlers. Last fall, using a US supplied coastal patrol craft, the Guinean Navy made its first seizure in recent history of a Soviet fishing vessel and confiscated the catch. [redacted]

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### Sierra Leone

Freetown's agreement expired late last year and new talks are underway. In November 1986, Freetown reluctantly renewed its agreement with the Soviets for one year, increasing by a modest 3 percent the amount of the Fransov--a Soviet/French/Sierra Leonean joint fishing venture--catch to be delivered to Sierra Leone. [redacted]

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[redacted] the Cabinet recently agreed to give notice to the Soviets of an intent to negotiate a new treaty which would conform to a tough new fisheries code.

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### Mauritania

In order to reduce pressures on fishery resources, Mauritania decided in early 1987 not to sign an agreement with either the USSR or Romania unless those countries agreed to replace factory ships with smaller vessels and to place restrictions on activities in shallow waters. Mauritania reached new agreement with the Soviets late last June. According to US Embassy reporting it calls for a reduction in the size and type of the Soviet catch in Mauritania's 200 nautical mile economic zone, a prohibition on fishing in waters shallower than 30 meters, and an increase in payments to Nouakchott. Mauritania's recent agreement with Romania banned large boats from fishing inside the 30 meter depth line, according to [redacted]

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### Guinea-Bissau

Despite the renewal of the USSR-Bissau fishing agreement in June 1986, the two countries failed to reach an agreement on licensing fees and debt repayment protocols until December 1987. According to Embassy and [redacted] Bissau asked the USSR to pay license fees similar to those paid by the EC<sup>1</sup> member fishing vessels and to accept payment of debt in devalued pesos, but the Soviets refused. As a result, legal Soviet fishing activity in territorial waters stopped for almost a year. Bissau suspended licensing of Soviet fishing vessels in late 1986 and in March 1987 seized a joint venture vessel in Bissau harbor. Bissau informed the Soviets that other boats would be seized until catches were divided as agreed to in the original accord; the Soviets were selling the entire catch for hard currency and crediting Bissau's share to reducing the debt of the joint venture company. The late 1987 agreement on the two protocols came after the Soviets agreed to reduce the number and size of the vessels operating in Bissauan waters, to provide 20 fishery scholarships, and offered to build a ship repair yard. The resolution of the joint venture protocol, however, is not a victory for Bissau. Although the arrangement keeps the Bissauan/USSR company solvent, it still favors the Soviets and reflects Bissau's failure to date to obtain the assistance necessary to strengthen its bargaining position, according to an Embassy report. [redacted]

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<sup>1</sup> Spain and Portugal became members of the EC on January 1, 1986.

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### Searching for Alternatives

According to US Embassy [ ] reporting, Guinea, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau are looking for alternatives to heavy reliance on Moscow. Both Mauritania and Guinea recently concluded agreements with the EC which may help them reduce--but not eliminate--their dependence on Soviet fishery agreements.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, the recent agreement with the EC that will provide Mauritania with upwards of \$10 million per year for fishing rights has made the Nouakchott less dependent on Soviet payments. [ ] this EC agreement had given the Nouakchott key leverage in its negotiations with the Soviets. Open sources indicate that the EC will compensate Nouakchott \$15.5 million (plus \$460,000 in scientific programs and scholarships for study) for a three-year agreement that allows members states to fish in Mauritanian waters. According to press reports, the EC will provide Conakry with \$4.6 million to help implement Soguipeche--a Franco-Guinean joint fishing venture. In a related development, the European Development Fund is helping to finance the construction of three trawlers and a fish processing complex for use by the Guinean joint-venture. When the vessels are completed in late 1988 or early 1989, Soguipeche hopes to use them to land 10,000 tons per year of fish both for the local market and for export. Under an earlier three-year agreement signed in July 1984, the EC is to pay Guinea \$6.6 million in return for fishing rights; in addition, each of its vessels is to pay a license fee of \$150,000 and a catch fee of between \$15 and \$40 per ton. Elsewhere, a local official says Sierra Leone is currently negotiating with the EC for an unspecified fisheries agreement to replace the Soviet accord. [ ]

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US Embassy reports indicate that Guinea-Bissau is also seeking changes, but its officials are just beginning to study options. Bissau is reportedly considering privatization of the fishing industry and would like US assistance in financing and obtaining vessels to replace those supplied by Moscow through the Bissauan-Soviet joint venture. The joint venture's director recently inquired about the possibility of obtaining concessionary financing to purchase US fishing boats. Guinea-Bissau also has expressed an interest in developing an arrangement with the Republic of Korea to replace the Soviets, according to State department reports. Bissau's Ambassador to the United States told a US official that his country was exploring the possibility of replacing the Soviets with the South Koreans in a joint fishing venture. [ ]

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Although new or expanded agreements with the Republic of Korea, the EC, or other non-African nations could reduce the dependence of coastal states on Moscow, these measures alone will probably not be enough to induce coastal states to

<sup>2</sup> Senegal and Sao Tome also signed agreements with EC earlier this year.

terminate Soviet accords. Industry reports show that European and South Korean fishermen are interested primarily in high-value species, which are already heavily fished, rather than the high-volume, low-value species usually caught by the Soviets.

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Other fishing nations such as the Japanese and the US are currently providing assistance to the fishing sector, but have only a minimal presence in fishery industry. The Chinese--who may offer a possible avenue for joint venture expansion in the future--have only recently begun to expand their overseas fishing efforts.

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### Enforcement Capabilities

Despite a continued inability of the majority of coastal states to effectively control their offshore waters,<sup>3</sup> several states--supported by Western assistance--are taking steps to reduce their vulnerability. According to US Embassy reporting, countries are increasing patrol efforts, implementing new fishing codes, and revamping institutional structures. These states are directing their efforts primarily toward increasing patrol craft availability, but they also recognize the need to provide air support, to train naval and coast guard units for this mission, and to revamp existing policy, law, and institutional structures. Support for developing and sustaining these capabilities is being provided on a bilateral basis by the United States through its African Coastal Security program, through Canadian International Development Assistance (CIDA), by the PRC, and by France as a by-product of French military support to the region. The World Bank is also providing assistance for programs facilitating enforcement activities.

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Mauritania has moved in the past year to strengthen both its institutional capabilities and its naval hardware. In 1986 Nouakchott made a one-time special budgetary allocation to the Navy to rebuild its capability and developed a plan to ensure

<sup>3</sup> According to US government experts on African coastal security, the establishment and maintenance of the capability necessary to enforce fishery agreements effectively requires: simple-maintenance diesel engine patrol boats--with the endurance and stability to stay on station for five to ten days--equipped with shore/sea/air links and armaments consistent with their mission; high-wing twin engine surveillance aircraft working in cooperation with naval patrol craft; a judicial code compatible with enforcement objectives; and appropriately trained and equipped naval and fishery personnel. In addition, government agencies involved in fishery management and enforcement need to coordinate their activities as do regional coastal states, to assure that available facilities, equipment, and manpower are effectively utilized.

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Table 1a

## US Assistance: West African Coastal Security

Country	Projects	Year Funded
Mauritania	Upgraded patrol boat electronics, provide US Coast Guard training	1986
	Upgrade secondary naval base (Nouakchott) to include communications gear, photo lab	1987
	Provide boarding equipment, long range binoculars, radar, small arms, and hand held radios	
Senegal	Construct a Forward Operating Base in the Casamance, and provide US Coast Guard training	1985, 1987
Gambia	Upgrade pier, refurbish communications base station, rehabilitative engineering plants, provide radio, navigation, radar equipment for patrol boats, and US Coast Guard training	1987
Guinea-Bissau	Provide Cessna recondition, spares, and transition training, and marine electronics and satellite navigation equipment	1986
	Upgrade patrol boat/base station electronics, provide uniform material, hull paints, boarding and photocopying/photographic equipment, materials to refurbish barracks, and outboard motors	1987
	Provide US Coast Guard training	1988
Guinea	Provide floating drydock system, HF radios to three base stations, two swiftship patrol boats, and two small harbor patrol boats	1984-86
	Upgrade Cessna for surveillance role	1987
Sierra Leone	105' offshore patrol craft, training, spare parts	1985-87
Ivory Coast	Radios for five patrol craft and one shore station	1985
Equatorial Guinea	68' patrol boat Support for patrol boat (proposed)	1986
Cameroon	30-38' Swiftship riverine patrol boat 3-50 meter patrol boats	1984 1987

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that the Navy receives regular financing. The Navy has been using its additional resources to step up its surveillance activities, according to DoD and Embassy reporting. In 1986, the Navy more than doubled its 1985 patrol time at sea and intercepted almost four times the number of vessels. During 1987, it seized over 40 vessels--eight of them Soviet ships. Three of its patrol vessels are currently being overhauled and the United States has delivered communications equipment. According to the [ ] Mauritania's Chief of Staff has ordered the Air Force to use its Piper Cheyenne aircraft for surveillance of its Exclusive Economic Zone, following a successful joint Mauritanian-US aircraft-assisted patrol of offshore waters. [ ]

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Sierra Leone's small Navy was formed in 1982 and is being expanded to enable it to accomplish its mission of protecting marine fishery resources. Last year the Navy acquired year two Shanghai class patrol craft from the Chinese to supplement its sole existing patrol craft--which is not operational because of a damaged hull--and received training from both US and Chinese teams. The two Chinese vessels made an impressive score on a trial patrol; a Soviet and a Venezuelan trawler operating illegally in territorial waters were arrested. According to a recent [ ] however, the Chinese craft are old and maintenance difficulties will probably limit their lifespans. [ ]

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Likewise, Guinea's Navy used a recently acquired US supplied patrol boat to seize Soviet, Spanish, and other foreign vessels conducting illegal fishing operations in territorial waters. Conakry has also written a new fishing code, and has obtained US funding to repair and upgrade its Cessna for a surveillance role. A recent joint operation involving a US-supplied patrol vessel and a French aircraft out of Dakar illustrated the utility of both air surveillance and regional cooperation. The operation resulted in the seizure of a Spanish fishing vessel operating on the Guinean side of the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau maritime boundary. The vessel was completely surprised by the air surveillance and could not get back across the border in time. [ ]

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Guinea-Bissau is receiving US assistance in developing its patrol capabilities. Bissau plans to establish a small forward base for patrol vessels near its disputed border with Senegal and an air surveillance capability. Bissauan officials have discussed regional cooperation--including the shared use of repair facilities and surveillance aircraft--with neighboring countries, and recently adopted a more clearly defined and exacting fishing code. The Navy is vigorously employing under-equipped patrol boats to seize vessels fishing illegally in territorial waters. [ ]

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According to [ ] Senegal--whose enforcement capabilities are among the best in the region--has

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recently revised the country's maritime fisheries laws, restructured their enforcement bureaucracy, increased patrol days at sea, and made efforts to include funding for enforcement activities in the national budget. The Senegalese are receiving assistance from both Canada and the United States in their efforts to achieve greater control over its EEZ. These efforts include development of air surveillance capabilities with Canadian assistance, the construction of a US funded support naval base in the Casamance region, and US Coast Guard instruction in fisheries protection techniques. [REDACTED]

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### Outlook

Western efforts to increase awareness among coastal states of the need for better management of their marine resources have begun to bear fruit. Although modest in scope and funding, these efforts have helped create--through a tangible display of Western concern--some counterbalance to Moscow's presence and influence in the fishery sector. [REDACTED]

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Despite gains, broader economic, political, and military considerations, as well as limited enforcement capabilities, will temper moves away from Moscow by these African States. Circumstances such as Freetown's concern over a shortage of fish on the local market that prompted a renewal of its treaty in 1986, for example, are likely to continue to work to Moscow's advantage until and unless these states find others nations or private interests to compete with the Soviets in this sector. Foreign private investment from geographically distant countries--other than South Korea--with well developed fishing industries is largely absent. The Chinese distant-water fleet recently began fishing in regional waters, but is currently not a significant player. At the same time, Soviet influence built up over the years is unlikely to fade quickly, and incidents--such as Moscow's use of its strong relationship with Guinea to gain the release of a Soviet trawler seized in October 1986--are likely to recur. Likewise, immediate rewards available to government officials and prominent businessmen as a result of existing relationships will continue to affect decisions on long-term--eventually more lucrative--alternate arrangements. Key to future progress will be continued Western encouragement and support for expanding, maintaining, and utilizing management and enforcement capabilities to meet the ongoing threat to their marine fishery resources. [REDACTED]

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